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Abstract: Despite the Heideggerian advice to remain silent about silence, this article explores the 
idea of a fundamental silence at the core of language, an idea that is present in the 
phenomenological tradition from Husserl to Derrida, but also in other thinkers. The relation 
between silence, speech, the face and identity is charted, and related to the question what it means 
to speak a language, and to speak this language rather than that language. The considerations 
establish the need for a philosophy of communication (in addition to a science of communication) 
and for an ethics of cautious anticipation regarding language change and linguistic diversity, an 
ethics which avoids the complicit dangers of (cultural and linguistic) fetishization and 





In what follows, I consider the correlation between language and identity from the point 
of view of the speaker of a language. My concern here is primarily theoretical or 
interpretative: how to understand what it means to speak a language, and this language rather 
than that language, and what the ramifications of this understanding are for the interaction 
between different languages, or perhaps rather between speakers of different languages. 
To indicate what is at stake here proleptically: speaking is the articulation of the living 
present, it is life being given to itself in the moment of its occurrence – but, as will 
hopefully become clear – this is a complex notion. 
I will presuppose the deep importance of language to human beings, as expressed in a 
well known remark by Wittgenstein: ‘the limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world.’1 How exactly to understand this statement will concern us later; here all I want to 
draw attention to is the fairly commonplace notion that our sense of identity, of who we 
are, is to a significant degree determined by the language we speak, and that different 
languages manifest to a certain degree different sets of (cultural) experiences and ways of 
interpreting the world – although these modes of interpretation are never entirely closed 
off to others (we are not advocating cultural relativism when we acknowledge that 
languages all in a different way articulate experience). When a community of speakers 
loses its language, by cultural, economic or military domination of another community, 
gradually or suddenly, by the process of extinction or by violent suppression, there is 
always a sense of a loss of a world. The politics of multiculturalism include the politics of 
linguistic diversity. Of course, a mere policy of linguistic diversity does not constitute the 
full acceptance of linguistic difference:  diversity could very easily become merely 
symbolic, museum-like, if it is exercised in the context of a clearly dominant language – 
                                                          
1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.6. The idea, is of course, much older and not limited to a 
particular philosophical tradition. Suffice it here to mention Humboldt’s identification of the 
‘spirit’ of a people with the inner form of its language. 
variety does not necessarily constitute diversity, a fact which applies just as much to 
cultural worlds as to languages. Variety can be predicated on an underlying sameness; 
diversity would seem to require the precarious tension of an open dialogue in the absence 
of a prior available codified commonality, whether this is linguistic or cultural. There is an 
abysmal difference between communication using a lingua franca, and communication in 
which direct translation into each other’s language occurs. 
I want, however, to approach the question from another perspective still. It seems to 
me that there is a need, in addition to the wide spectrum of endeavours to give 
objectifying explanations of the complexities involved in the relation between culture, 
language, cognition and the individual, to articulate the phenomenon of ‘speaking-a-
language’, as it were, from within, in order to understand not just how the world is 
present (or absent) in my language, and vice versa, but also how I am present (or absent) 
in my language. Only if we understand this dimension in its own terms, will we be able to 
gain an adequate insight into what is at stake in the general phenomenon of human 
communication, and in the more specific phenomenon of linguistic particularism, of that 
fact that we are speakers of a language. 
The idea that the objective study of language and language use is possible only on the 
basis of a prior articulation of language and language use in experiential, or 
phenomenological, terms, is not new. It forms the basis of the phenomenological project 
that was started by Husserl over a century ago – the battle against psychologism and 
naturalism in the study of consciousness and existence - and is not just limited to the 
study of language, but stretches out to encompass the entire empirical domain: 
 
‘Thus “phenomenology” means apophainesthai ta phainomena – to let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.’2 
 
As long as we hold on to the idea that scientific truth needs to be founded in indubitable 
truth, that its concepts have to derive from a source that is certain or, if we dispel with 
certainty and what cannot be doubted, concerns a level of presentation or manifestation at 
which the notions of certainty and doubt are not applicable, phenomenology is necessary 
in providing that foundation. The disclosing articulation of ‘what shows itself form itself’ 
precedes any other analysis. 
While the project of phenomenology has been heavily criticised, and in a way brought 
to closure, by the critique of Derrida and others3, that critique moved and continues to 
move within the domain laid out originally by Husserl and which provided philosophy 
with a role of its own among the sciences. Both Husserl and Derrida would probably 
agree with Heidegger’s statement that (empirical) science ‘doesn’t think’4; the activity of 
                                                          
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, Oxford: Blackwell 1962, p. 58. 
3 D. Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, Abingdon: Routledge 2000, pp. 435ff. It is important to 
note that currently there is a revival of phenomenological work, particularly in France (see e.g. M. 
Richir, Fragments Phénoménologiques sur le Langage, Grenoble: Millon 2005). 
4 ‘Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht’, Heidegger, Was heißt denken?, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1984, p. 4. 
articulating the constitution of meaning, and of responding to meaning, cannot happen or 
be understood in terms that are abstractive of or external to that very meaning – or to put 
it differently, it is only from within thought that we can understand thought. The 
difference between Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida concerns the what and how of what 
shows itself, not the basic orientation of thought, the basic project or aim of philosophy, 
even if between each of these the concept of philosophy undergoes deep changes. 
The question what it means for a speaker to speak a language has, at least also, a 
properly ‘philosophical’ dimension, one which we can only get close to by using the 
language of philosophy, or phenomenological description and analysis and reflective 
critique. An understanding that would be based on such an approach would not be 
incommunicable to other types of accounts, but it would have to be developed on and in 
its own terms nonetheless. 
 
Phenomenology of Speech 
 
The place of speech in phenomenology is not peripheral. Derrida argued that presence to 
self, which is the heart of phenomenological analysis, takes its origin from the presence to 
self that is given with the experience of hearing oneself speak.5 But, as Derrida showed, 
the analysis of the phenomenon of hearing oneself speak establishes that there is an 
opening, a hiatus, within it – the present is already, from the start, infected by the past and 
the future, by what is no longer present and what is not yet present. In the concepts of 
difference and deconstruction, Derrida made this realisation to the guiding motif of his 
philosophical writings: presence and absence (and many other opposed terms like it) are 
internal to each other but at the same time remain heterogeneous.6 Schiller said: “when the 
soul speaks, alas, the soul speaks no longer.” There is an indelible gap between the self and 
its speech, and yet the self speaks. Whereas spoken words necessarily appear as being of 
perfect proximity to the speaker – I hear myself speak immediately – and as such seem to 
be the perfect union of the empirical, or material, and the ideal, on closer inspection (even 
here) there is a constitutive gap: 
 
“Taking auto-affection as the exercise of the voice, auto-affection supposed that a pure difference 
comes to divide self-presence. In this pure difference is rooted the possibility of everything we 
think we can exclude from auto-affection: space, the outside, the world, the body, etc. As soon as it 
is admitted that auto-affection is the condition for self-presence, no pure transcendental reduction 
is possible. But it was necessary to pass through the transcendental reduction in order to grasp this 
difference in what is closest to it—which cannot mean grasping it in its identity, its purity, or its 
origin, for it has none.” (Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 82) 
                                                          
5 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
6 I owe this fortunate formulation to Leonard Lawlor, Derrida, entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#Inc (accessed 18 December 2009). It is 
also a concise way of expressing what the paradoxical ground structure of human 
communication is: presence and absence at the same time (and what do ‘same’ and ‘time’ mean 
here?), the presence of absence and the absence of presence. 
 This is not the place to consider the question whether Derrida has been correct in his 
critique of Husserlian phenomenology7. I take from his analysis the idea that speech is 
possible on the basis of a difference that is at work in the heart of the phenomenon of 
presence-to-self, and that consequently the self that speaks, the subject, is produced by, or 
always inscribed in, the movement of difference, that it is not transcendental as that to 
which difference happens (p. 82). The self that speaks, the living present, is a trace, 
constituted by the difference that makes speech possible and yet always removed from 
who speaks as well as from what is said: 
 
But this pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, introduces into 
self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively excluded from it. The living present 
springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. It is 
always already a trace. This trace cannot be thought out on the basis of a simple present whose life 
would be within itself; the self of the living present is primordially a trace. The trace is not an 
attribute; we cannot say that the self of the living present "primordially is" it. Being-primordial 
must be thought on the basis of the trace, and not the reverse. This protowriting is at work at the 
origin of sense. (Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 85) 
 
There is, I would like to say, a silence at the heart of the self of the living present.8 Husserl 
and Derrida give differing accounts of this silence – for Husserl there is a consciousness 
that precedes predicative articulation of its contents, and as such is silent – the 
prelinguistic disclosure, presence, of phenomenality in the transcendental ego; for Derrida 
it is only within language that the trace of what escapes language – the self of the living 
present – is given as being in abeyance.9 
                                                          
7 In particular, Derrida discusses the relation between sense and temporality, and argues that the 
auto-affection which constitutes self presence is the temporal relation between now and its 
articulation, in which it becomes a trace – the spoken word is gone the moment it is spoken; it is 
always already ‘outside of itself’, ‘going forth into the world’, and as such at odds with the 
‘inwardness of speech’ (p. 86). The movement of time appears as constitutive for meaning. 
Derrida notes that Husserl himself was aware of the fact that temporality cannot be properly 
named: ‘every language fails to describe this pure movement other than by metaphor’ (p. 84). 
8 Inversely, Derrida analyses the secret as requiring auto-affection: I have so say a secret to myself 
in order to keep it – and maybe even always to another as well – even if only as a fictitious 
sharing or representation. A secret must be shared. (See Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: 
Denials”, in:  S. Budick & W. Iser (eds.), Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in 
Literature and Literary Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, pp 3-70.) 
9 It seems to me that Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl in his account of the silence at the core 
of language, but he highlights the fact that meaning has to be apprehended – language, also 
my own, has to be heard, and as such requires a preliminary silence which is nevertheless 
conscious:  
‘[L]anguage presupposes nothing less than a consciousness of language, a silence of 
consciousness embracing the world of speech in which words first receive a form and a 
 The silent core of language 
 
We can see the accounts of the act of speaking that we find in phenomenology as accounts 
of mediation, or more precisely of the relation between the immediate and the mediated. 
With this opposition we enter dialectical thinking. We must realise that there is a 
paradoxical relationship here (see note 6). The unmediated, immediate, is as such the 
immanent horizon of mediation – this would, I suggest, be an alternative formulation of 
the idea of the trace, for what else is it than the idea of an immanent transcendence, a 
“transcending without transcendence”?10 As Bloch (who used the idea of the trace long 
before Derrida, in a similar way11) says, it is ‘source and mouth’ of the process of 
expression but as such remains – as yet – extraterritorial to it.12 In a real sense the core of 
that process is something that has not entered into its own process of expression at all, 
and yet that process is its eventual articulation.13 Therefore it is as much origin as total 
completion – it is what circumscribes the process of expression – temporality in Derrida’s 
sense - as its principle. Is the difference that is at play here the constitutive but endlessly 
implicit, unlocalisable movement of meaning; that which always upsets any identity of 
meaning (Derrida’s différance) but has no goal? That which is outside all orientation, but 
which also makes meaning possible by opening up a difference that makes contrast 
possible, and therefore thematization and signification? Or is there a way, maybe even a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
meaning. This is why consciousness is never subordinated to any empirical language, why 
languages can be translated and learned, and finally, why language is not an attribute of 
external origin, in the sociologist’s sense. Behind the spoken cogito, the one which is 
converted into discourse and into essential truth, there lies a tacit cogito, myself experienced 
by myself.’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, London: Routledge 1962, p. 403) The 
fact that languages can be translated and learned, and are, in certain aspects of their constitution, 
not open to ‘sociology’, would have to receive a different explanation in Derrida’s account of 
speech; a beginning of an account could be found in the realisation that the movement of 
difference which constitutes the subject as trace, despite (or rather because of) having no identity, 
purity or origin, is always the same. If repetition is not possible, then precisely because of that 
each iteration or now becomes infected with the sameness of singularity. It remains unclear 
whether this would constitute a point where the Hegelian dialectic of being and nothing could be 
re-introduced to overtake the movement of difference, mutatis mutandis, and to constitute a 
sublation of the notion of the speaker, the ‘one’ who speaks, rather than its deconstruction, but 
the utopian dimension of communication that I discuss below could be taken in this way. (For a 
further discussion of this point, see my ‘Substance as Depth’, in: Zeilinger (ed.), VorSchein, 
Nürnberg: Antogo 2010 (forthcoming)). 
10 Bloch, Atheismus im Christentum, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1969, p. 3. My translation. 
11 See his Spuren (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1969; English Traces, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996). 
12 ‘Quell und Mündung’, Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1959, p. 336.  
13 The word ‘core’ has to be understood very precisely here: it should be divested of connotation 
of a hidden presence. Yet it cannot simply be replaced by ‘margin’ as its metaphysical other that 
is inscribed in it (Derrida). Truth is not a minted coin which can be taken in just like that (Hegel); 
“core” points to something that is not yet there (see the discussion below). 
necessity, to say that the trace is not so much a trace of a subjectivity or self that is already 
there, present but hidden and attempting to fuse with its own act of expression into the 
living moment of self-presence, but of a self that is not yet14, and as such, in its negativity, 
motivates speech, its eventual ‘presence’ being no more than a trace of the completion of 
expression, not even further analysable or imaginable (and as such acquitting those who 
speak in its name of the spell of ‘metaphysical presence’)? Is it not the case that even for 
Derrida the moment of that which may come to pass, the moment that should never be 
made impossible and which he liked to call justice, has to be seen in the light of the not-yet 
of the trace; of its promise, despite everything that has been said, of the ‘soul’ ‘speaking’ – 
of an encounter? For one thing, how can the illusion of presence, the metaphysical urge, 
otherwise be explained?15 There appears to be a prolepsis at work in our speaking of, and 
experience of, the self as speaking – we speak in the name of one who is not yet there. But 
that very structure, which we may perhaps call the proleptic structure of speech, is given. 
A utopian dimension, an orientation, a dimension which Bloch called hope, seems to be 
involved in the relation between self, expression, temporality and speech or language. 
I have here merely sketched a possible path for thought which would make it possible to 
articulate the silence at the core of language, the silence in speech, as the location of the 
speaker in his or her language, and moreover of seeing that silence as, although 
constitutive of the speaker, a not-yet, a pre-figuring, which puts the speaker in the light of 
not yet being what he or she is, or could, be, as much as the language itself that he or she 
speaks. Both speaker and language have, in this precise sense, their utopias. In the silence 
of the speaker, the silence as the absence of speech (which is always the possibility of a 
beginning of speech) but, more strongly, also the silence that becomes visible, audible, 
only in speech, in that silence origin and destiny, source and mouth, of the spoken life 
trace themselves. 
 
The multiverse of languages 
 
We have now detached the idea of ‘my language’, as the medium for my ethno-cultural 
sphere of belonging, from the utopian sense of belonging in which I could become to 
belong to myself, my world and my language – the completion of desire for an integral 
restitution of self. We have also considered the idea that this desire for an integral 
restitution of self cannot be eliminated from an adequate philosophical account of what is 
involved in speaking a language, that the very act of speaking can effect many things, but 
that it is always also the articulation of this desire. What then is the relation between this 
almost existential meaning of ‘speaking’, which now differs remarkably little from the 
meaning of ‘being’, and the language that I speak? For phenomenology the relation is 
contingent, as we have seen – the silence of consciousness precedes language and makes 
                                                          
14 The concept of the ‘not-yet’ as a basic category for ontology and anthropology is derived from 
Ernst Bloch’s philosophy. See J. Siebers, ‘Categorial Intelligibility’, in: F. Vidal, Träume gegen 
Mauern, Talheim: Talheimer Verlag, 2009, pp. 83-94) 
15 Assuming we do not want to revert to a Heideggerian account in terms of Being arranging its 
own withdrawal. 
translation possible. Empirically there may be many regions of experience that are initially 
opened up or closed off for me by the language I have learnt to express myself in, and 
even phenomenology presupposes that I have been brought up in a community, a 
tradition, a language - but transcendentally the diversity of languages is of no effect. 
Strangely enough, perhaps, something like this could be claimed to apply to Derrida’s 
analysis as well; the movement of difference is so omnipresent that the difference between 
languages and between occasions of speech lapses.16  
On one hand this is a result I welcome. From a philosophical point of view it remains 
necessary, and perhaps today more so than before, to call attention to the danger of 
fetishizing languages and cultures and to point to the gap, the open space, between 
identity and cultural or linguistic identity. When a language or a culture is taken to have a 
fixed form, or even a fixed path along which it develops and changes, it can no longer be 
seen as the place where the openness, the trace-like nature, of human identity comes 
forward, and as we have seen, that openness, which is closely related to temporality itself, 
is the basis of meaning. We could say that tradition, and here I take a language to be a 
tradition of words, is only meaningful in the face of its utopia, of what it, in a radical 
sense, not yet is. 
On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that only within language the 
trace of the self as living presence occurs. For Derrida, the possibility of an outside, of 
space, the body, is inherent to the movement of difference.17 For Bloch, in a similar way, 
the unmediated core of mediation is only there in expression, in externalisation – the 
mode of inherence may be that of exterritoriality, but without the externalisation of 
utterance the trace, and the core, become meaningless concepts.18  
My language is never simply, nor entirely, mine. Neither am I ever simply or entirely 
my language’s. That circumstance, however, constitutes me as what I am: a trace, oriented 
on an identity I am not yet, in Bloch’s words, a Heimat – a home. If the relapse into a 
reified idea of home or fatherland (or ‘my language’) is to be avoided, this dimension 
needs to be recognised as constitutive of what it means to speak a language. The forceful, 
or anonymised, withering away of my own language under the invasion of another’s 
language – whether at the level of communities or individuals – can only mean that 
recognition is lacking, even if there can be other courses of events in which languages 
                                                          
16 The idea that ‘there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many 
philosophers and linguists have supposed’, was advanced by Davidson (Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 446). The communicative exchange 
precedes language, as it precedes the mind and society. See E. Dresner, “Radical Interpretation, 
the Primacy of Communication and the Bounds of Language”, in: Empedocles – European Journal 
for the Philosophy of Communication, 2009 (1.1.), pp. 123-134. 
17 As we have seen above, he calls this moment ‘protowriting’, the writing that is at the heart of 
speech. 
18 Bloch even relates, in a slightly more traditional language than Derrida, but to the same effect it 
seems, the ‘breath of the spoken word’ to the ‘printed letter’ as the only thing that ‘looks after’, or 
‘heeds’ ‘die Sache selber’, the thing itself. (Bloch ,Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie, Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp 1970, p. 11; my translation). 
disappear or change beyond recognition. The point is not historical finality, but how to 
deal with the diversity of languages in the time in which ‘we’ live. That speech is possible 
depends on the movement of difference, on the fact that between language and speaker 
the not-yet opens up; the idea of a single language lives off the premature desire to close 
that opening by force, in the name of perfect expressibility: like ‘metaphysics’, it comes 
too soon – not contingently, but in a radical way, by ignoring what makes itself possible in 
the first place.19  
It seems that it could only be an attitude of caution in anticipation, of acceptance of the 
not-yet, that can determine our attitude towards the languages we are placed in – the 
other of a holy reverence on one hand, and an instrumental dismissal on the other, that a 
proto-ethics of linguistic diversity would seek to develop. The diversity of languages itself 
is of course an important indication of this caution, and it is in this light that we can say 
with Goethe that we would have to speak another language before we could say that we 
are able to understand our own, or what our own language (and our own speaking) 
drives at – Heimat as used above. The term ‘multiverse’, which we find in the works of 
Bloch, could be used to indicate the relation between languages. From the point of view of 
the linguistic utopia, that which remains exterritorial to the life of a language, the utopian 
direction appears as an invariant – it is always the same – but from the point of view of 
the individual languages it appears as radial difference or multitude. A multiverse, in 
which the multitude is turned-towards (vertere) the invariant of direction, which, 
however, is not available for articulation. 
 
The silence of the face 
 
‘In the silence of the face, man is truly at home’, Agamben writes. ‘Unspoken words and 
intentions that have remained unfulfilled’ leave their mark on our expression, the 
‘character’ of our faces, but the beauty of the face is the silence of language itself, the 
‘becoming visible of the word’, the ‘idea of language’20 – and as such an index of identity 
as home, Heimat. It is evident that the analysis of the face can proceed along the same lines 
as the analysis of the word – from the ‘metaphyiscal’ idea that there is a presence which 
decides to articulate itself, and thinks it finds that it can achieve both visibility and ideality 
– externality and presence-to-self – in the face (as in the spoken word), we can move to the 
insight that it is the movement of difference which makes the face possible, as itself only 
there in a movement which cannot be fixed and which constitutes the one whose face it is as 
a trace in, gliding over, the movements of the face. The face is not simply a medium, as a 
letter or other message might be, but it also is not simply the person. The person is 
                                                          
19 Perhaps this ignoring of what really matters, if I may put it like this, is a necessity, or at least 
almost unavoidable, and the point of philosophy is to show us the way through it, rather than 
around it. 
20 G. Agamben, Idea of Prose, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, p. 113. 
exterritorial to the face, and yet I see him or her when I look at his or her face; the face is 
his or hers.21  
The phenomenological analysis and its deconstruction have deliberately ignored the 
communicative dimension of language and expression, as can be seen from various 
remarks in the works of Husserl as well as Derrida.22 The point about the self as living 
presence for Husserl is precisely that communication, Kundgabe, is not necessary for it – 
when I speak to myself, I am not informing myself about something. Auto-affection 
involves a hearing to be sure, but it is a hearing of myself by myself. For Derrida the 
common conception of communication as a sharing of meaning would be problematic, 
because the movement of difference will always inscribe an impurity in the very act of 
affection, whether it be affection of other or self. For him, in a way, the whole point of 
difference is to deconstruct the idea of communication. 
And yet, in the face perhaps even more than in the spoken word, I behold, encounter, 
another – not a sight or a sound on the basis of which I conclude to the existence of a 
hidden but real other self, but someone, someone for whom a world exists, for whom 
others exist. In the silent face I can even encounter the whole spectrum of the not-yet in 
language and self that I discussed earlier.  
The face is unique. It seems to differ from the spoken word in that the word is 
essentially a presence to self – I hear myself speaking in the same instance as I speak – 
whereas I do not see my face in the same instance as I express myself. My face relegates 
me to the passivity of being seen by others; even if I can feel the movements of my facial 
muscles when I laugh or frown, my face remains hidden from me. The indelible difference 
to self becomes especially apparent when I look at myself in the mirror. I meet someone 
face-to-face; the face is that by which we can come to stand over against each other, but I 
cannot come to stand over against myself in that way. The face is more radically an 
outside, a spatialisation, then the word – more radically an impurity in the presence-to-
self that now more radically even than before appears as a trace or a not-yet.23 It is now 
mediated essentially by the other whom I encounter ‘face to face’. Only in the 
phenomenon of face to face communication, the full paradox in the relation between 
speaker and language becomes apparent, the full implication of me in my speaking, the 
full extent to which ‘I’ is a movement outside of oneself and a not-yet having returned, via 
another. As Ernst Bloch put it: ‘Ich bin. Aber ich habe mich nicht. Darum werden wir erst.’ (I 
                                                          
21 And what is said of the face here, can be extended to the body, not as a material corpus but as 
my body – I do not have a body, I am my body – and yet not simply. The utopian dimension of 
the face would take us into (a reinterpretation of) religious domains: 1 Cor. 13: ‘for now we see 
through a glass darkly, but then face to face’. In addition, the face and the body, just like 
language, require themselves a context of care: our relation to them is not only passive but also 
active. 
22 An exception would be Merleau-Ponty’s chapter on the body as expression and speech (in 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 164-199); an analysis of this text must be left out of 
the present study, unfortunately. 
23 There is no cognitive, evidential, value as such in linguistic usage, but do we not say that 
something ‘is written all over someone’s face’? 
am. But I do not have myself. Therefore we are yet becoming.)24 With the aspect of the face 
we can account for the communicative dimension of speech and meaning; language 
remains unthinkable without the spoken word that crosses over between faces, that is 
spoken through a face (per-sonans) to a face. The ‘idea of language’, as Agamben says, 
becomes visible in the silence of the face. 
 
From Philosophy of Language to Language Politics 
 
In the foregoing analysis allowed myself some rhetorical licence in tyring to articulate 
what I think are essential correlations and aspects of the speaker-speech-language 
complex. A failure to recognise at least the area which I have tried to indicate seems to me 
to have potentially damaging consequences not just for a theory of communication, but 
also for the practical (ethical and political) aspects of language policy and the education of 
articulate citizens. In order to achieve this aim, I have developed the beginnings of an 
account of what can only be called a Blochian or utopian philosophy of communication – 
the utopia of expression I have hinted at should however not be taken to imply a 
pragmatic programme of action by which to achieve an abstract present perfect that is, 
somehow, somewhere,  already waiting for us. Rather, the communicative utopia has to 
be seen as concrete, not abstract – a motif in understanding the orientation that is to be 
found within speech, and only in the name of which the idea of expression as someone 
expressing himself or herself regarding something can be meaningful. The burden of 
proof regarding the relation between the trace of Derrida and the not-yet of Bloch has not 
been lifted entirely here, but merely indicated. The difference is crucial, though; it is the 
difference between the invariant of direction that is exterritorial to history but as such 
implied in it, and the endless sameness of difference. In the play between these two 
concepts, we can attempt to retrieve an understanding of truth, of encounter and of 
cultural progress (all of which must be left to another occasion here), and in the wake of 
that attempt, perhaps come to understand these somewhat obscure but nevertheless, as I 
hope to have shown, essential aspects of the human being as ‘the one who speaks his 
language’.  
The analysis has also indicated a road along which the concept of dialogue, of face-to-
face conversation, can be explored in dimensions that perhaps up until now have not 
received enough attention. The full externalisation that we uncovered in the concept of the 
face turns out to be essential for speech.25  
I started by quoting Wittgenstein, ‘the limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world.’ I used this quotation in a merely suggestive way, and have not occupied myself 
with an exegesis of its meaning. Yet, the threat of ‘relativism’ appears in my analysis as 
unfounded; the silence in language is the not-yet of the universality of reason. It provides 
                                                          
24 Bloch, Spuren, p. 1. My translation. 
25 The application the category of ‘face’ has found in pragmatics, on the basis of the sociology of 
Goffman, can be seen as a codified cognate of face as it is described here; the gap between the 
two, however, is deep. This would be good example of an aspect of language that is not open to 
sociology, as I indicated above. 
the antidote to relativism, even if, or rather because, it is the opposite of an available, 
positive, universal. In that silence we encounter also ourselves as yet to become who we 
are – and this applies not just to the individual speaker of a language, but to a language 
community as a whole. In the light of the silence of the universal, which as I hope I have 
shown is not a mere absence or negation of the universal but a not-yet given with 
language, we can modify or understanding of ‘identity’ as something that is also a 
becoming, a process, rather than a state. The idea of identity is closely connected to the 
idea of the true language. We can understand why by considering that language is the 
medium by which we connect outer and inner experience. Perhaps the idea of a perfect 
language, which has been a constant in Judeo-European culture from the idea of the 
adamite tongue to the logicists’ idea of a perfectly transparent and unambiguous 
language of thought, goes astray when it is conceived of as something that is at our 
disposal, that we have or can create a language with which to name all things. Such a 
language would not be the language of human communication – it would be a regimented 
tool to coordinate behaviour, but not the living word of the human encounter. The 
unification of the human encounter and the language in which to name all things, the 
dream of reason we could perhaps say, has to be conceived of as a not-yet, a perspective 
in the light of which present actuality can be measured and sometimes judged – a hope, 
regulative idea or counterfactual presupposition.26 
Language violence, when it takes the form of discriminating against a group of people 
on account of the language that they speak, or prohibiting them from speaking and 
developing their language, is a gesture that lives off the denial of the proleptic nature of 
the universal: it mis-takes the premonition of identity, or ‘home’, that is given with the 
strong experience of being at home in one’s language for the admonition to incarcerate 
identity in one’s present language. What would be required, on the other hand, would be 
an attitude that recognises that there is no easy way of transcending one’s language – for 
example in a constructed universal lingua franca – and yet we are never already or fully at 
home in our language. The ontological constitution of language is such that we can only 
speak of ‘languages’ – a pluralism is given with the fact that the words I speak are never 
simply my own. In that respect there is little difference between the level of the individual 
speaker, who uses words that have first been spoken to her, and the level of what we call 
the different languages. From the point of view of the speaker, Parole (or Bakhtinian 
discourse) appears to have priority over langue, and parole is the world of the spoken and 
repeated word, open to drift and difference. Our analysis of the relation between speech, 
the face, the word and silence has enabled us to draw this conclusion. The analysis can be 
made fruitful for the political theory of language if we see that what is here said about 
identity constitutes an addition to the discourse of power that has been developed in 
political linguistics. Whereas it has been a structural feature of much political linguistics to 
treat identities as given and as entwined in politicised struggles for hegemony, our 
                                                          
26 There are obvious parallels to be drawn here to Habermas’ idea of the ideal speech situation, as 
well as to Badiou’s notion of evil as ‘the desire to name at any price’. See my ‘What Cannot be 
Said: Speech and Violence’, Journal of Global Ethics (7.2), 2010, forthcoming. I prefer the language 
of hope to that of the regulative idea or counterfactual presupposition, for reasons given above. 
analysis highlight features of the idea of identity which are the opposite of power; no 
discourse of power can articulate what is at stake in the notion of the silence of the face, 
yet that is what underpins the notion of identity. While I do not dispute that we need 
recourse to a discourse of power when we investigate the relations between language 
communities, it does appear to be the case that the exclusivity of the discourse of power in 
this context is itself an example of not adequately acknowledging the proleptic nature of 
language and identity.27 Moreover, an ethics of linguistics pluralism cannot be based 
solely on an emancipatory discourse which ends with a truce between or at best a co-
existence of, linguistic communities: no one owns their identity enough to stand such a 
situation, thus always spawning new incarnations of imperialism. Language is 
intrinsically pluriform, my language and the language of my community is always 
already permeated by the language of another and by another language – the space of 
language – both the linguistic space and the space in which a language is materially 
present - is necessarily open; attitudes of forced linguistic preservation, linguistic 
ethnocentrism and bland imperialistic cosmopolitanism destroy the living space of 
language. The politics of language has to be based on the ethics of language. The ethics of 
language has to be based on an ontological understanding of the nature of the human 
communicative encounter. 
Linguistic imperialism, such as described in various places in this book, is, in terms of 
the foregoing account, not simply the silencing of one language by another, but a 
‘silencing of silence’ which affects all who share the space of language. While the 
immediate causes or goals of linguistic imperialism will often be found in certain 
economic, political or cultural interests, and the immediate effects of it will make 
themselves felt in clearly visible economic, political and cultural exclusion, the deep 
effects (and indeed efficacy) of linguistic discrimination can only be adequately explained 
if we take into consideration the vulnerable but essential dynamics that lay at the heart of 
the act of speaking. The consolation I have offered, that in the act of linguistic oppression, 
the majority language loses itself, its voice, just as much as the minority language, may 
seem far-fetched and, in the light of these direct effects, not of much significance. But 
philosophy of language, and indeed linguistics, cannot stop imperialism or the deadening 
of languages by museal preservation and ethnocentrism .They may, however, help us 
understand better what is at stake in formulating and enacting a politics of language that 
aims to make space for all. It goes without saying that in an age of continuing 
globalisation the question of language and identity will have to be asked over and over 
again, and will determine significantly social developments in the years to come. We 
blind ourselves to its ramifications if we ignore the existential dimensions of it. 
 
                                                          
27 It would take us too far out of the context of the present paper to investigate the propensity to 
this mistake, which I think is given with the utopian ontological structure of identity. I refer here 
to Kenneth Burke’s sadly somewhat neglected suggestion that the drift towards identification 
and perfection is intrinsic to language use and to meaning and has to be understood as 
transcendence, which would enable us to articulate these connections in more depth. See Burke, 
The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1970. 
